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Professor Charles Sampford 
At Melbourne University, Charles Sampford graduated at the top of his class in each of politics, philosophy and 
law, gaining a ‘double first’ in Arts and the Supreme Court Prize in Law, proceeding to a DPhil in Law from 
Oxford in 1984.  In 1991 he was invited to come to Queensland as Foundation Dean of Law at Griffith 
University establishing a Law School hailed by Sir Ninian Stephen as a ‘revolution in legal education.’  In 1999, 
he was appointed Foundation Director of the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance (the only 
Australian centre in law or governance to receive centre funding from the Australian Research Council).  In 
September 2004, he became the Director of IEGL (the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, a joint initiative 
of the United Nations University, Griffith, QUT and ANU).  At the same time he took on the role of Convenor of 
the Australian Research Council funded Governance Research Network.   
 
Foreign fellowships include the Visiting Senior Research Fellow at St John's College Oxford (1997) and a 
Senior Fulbright Award to Harvard University at the Program for Ethics and the Professions (2000). 
 
Professor Sampford has written some ninety articles and chapters in Australian and foreign journals and has 
completed twenty one books and edited collections for international publishers including Oxford University 
Press, Blackwell, Routledge, Cavendish and Ashgate.  During the 1980s, he concentrated on jurisprudence, 
constitutional law and legal education.  The bulk of his research since 1990 has been in the areas of applied 
ethics, integrity systems, the rule of law and the role of values in international affairs.  In June 2008, his work 
was recognized by the peak Australian Research funding body (the Australian Research Council) who invited 
the 20 researchers they thought had most clearly ‘made a difference’ to the inaugural Graeme Clarke Outcomes 
Forum held at Parliament House Canberra.  Prof Sampford was one of only five researchers invited from the 
humanities and social sciences.   
 
This year, he was invited to speak at the United Nations on building the International Rule of Law and to join a 
small group led by Philippe Sands to draft a code of ethics for international lawyers – both events occurring in 
June. This public lecture encompasses insights arising from each. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan 
professions (law and arms) into two of the least cosmopolitan.  Sovereign states determined the content of the 
law within their borders – including which, if any, ecclesiastical law was to be applied; what form of economic 
regulation was adopted; and what, if any, international law applied.  Similarly, states sought to ensure that all 
military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world 
may significantly reverse these processes. 
 
The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the ethics of 
how, and for what ends, it is practised.  Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of sovereign states 
through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting with the rule of law.  An 
increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks.  The same could be said of the military. 
 
This essay will review the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions 
and outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers can and should play in it.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “The time has come for mankind to make the rule of law in international affairs as normal as it 
is now in domestic affairs. Of course the structure of such law must be patiently built, stone by 
stone. The cost will be a great deal of hard work, both in and out of government particularly in 
the universities of the world.  Plainly one foundation stone of this structure is the International 
Court of Justice … [and] the obligatory jurisdiction of that Court.  … One final thought on rule 
of law between nations: we will all have to remind ourselves that under this system of law one 
will sometimes lose as well as win. But … if an international controversy leads to armed 
conflict, everyone loses.” President Dwight D Eisenhower 1  
 
Those who believe that good governance should start at home and extend abroad will easily agree but 
may be surprised at the source of the quote and be more optimistic about its achievement.  In this 
lecture, I will argue that the emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned 
two of the most cosmopolitan professions, the law and the military, into the least cosmopolitan.  
Sovereign states determined the content of the law within their borders – including what elements of 
ecclesiastical law, law merchant and international law applied.  Similarly, states sought to ensure that 
all military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-
Westphalian world may significantly reverse this process. 
 
The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the 
ethics of how, and for what ends, it is practised.  Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of 
sovereign states through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting 
with the rule of law.  An increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks – and may find 
unexpected allies within the profession of arms.  This lecture apply these ideas to the rule of law, 
reviewing the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions and 
                                                 
1 D. Eisenhower (1959) Remarks Upon Receiving an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws at Delhi University December 11, 
1959 <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeches/1959>. Those who are surprised by the source of the quote should 
recall that this soldier turned politician used federal troops to protect a black student in Little Rock and warned of the 
military industrial complex.  In Delhi, the old warrior who had masterminded the 6 June Normandy landings of the ‘United 
Nations’ (a phrase used in newspapers on that day) made his plea for law not war. 
 3
outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers and soldiers can and 
should play in it.2 
 
WESTPHALIAN STATES AND TWO COSMOPOLITAN PROFESSIONS 
Pepo, Bologna and pre-Westphalian professions 
The gradual evolution of the institutions that gave rise to universities means that there is no precise date 
for when particular institutions became ‘universities’ and which can claim the mantle of the ‘first’.3 
Some ancient bodies might claim as much right to call themselves ‘universities’ as the eleventh and 
twelfth century European centres of learning in Bologna, Paris and Oxford.  China’s Nanjing (c200), 
Morocco’s Al-karouine (859) and Egypt’s Al Azar (975) could claim to be the oldest continuing 
universities while India’s Odantapuri (c550 BC to c1040 AD) and Jalanda (c450 BC to 1193 AD) have 
respectable claim to the be the earliest institutions that could be called universities.  Although predated 
by a medical school at Salerno, the institution with the claim to be the first university in Europe is the 
University of Bologna and there is evidence of law lectures being given by the monk Pepo as early as 
1076.4  Universities and university law teaching thus predated the modern state by nearly six centuries 
(and predating the joint stock company, which they have latterly been encouraged to emulate, by nearly 
eight centuries).  They were originally among the most cosmopolitan of institutions.   
 
The students of the time learnt Roman Law, Canon Law and, as it developed, the Law Merchant.5  
Such law was not made by territorial sovereigns but was developed by jurists, priests and traders and 
covered most of Mediaeval Europe. Indeed, the re-emergence of international trade involved issues 
which the existing local laws were not equipped to address but which the preserved Roman law could.  
Accordingly, the legal education gained by students at Bologna and, later, Paris, Oxford and other 
mediaeval universities allowed them to work for any of the Princes of Western Europe and to argue in 
many courts – making the profession of law highly cosmopolitan. There was no ‘dingo fence’ in 
                                                 
2 In so doing, it will expand on views expressed in C. Sampford, “Challenges to the Concepts of ‘Sovereignty’ and 
‘Intervention’,” closing keynote World Congress on Legal and Social Philosophy, 1999, published in T. Campbell and B.M. 
Leiser (eds), Human Rights in Philosophy and Practice, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001 pp. 335–391; C. Sampford, ‘What’s a 
Lawyer doing in a nice place like this? Lawyers and applied ethics’, Legal Ethics 1, 1998; C. Sampford, ‘Get New Lawyers’, 
Legal Ethics 6, 2003, 185–205;  C. Sampford, ‘More and More Lawyers But Still No Judges’, Legal Ethics 8, 2005,16–22; 
and C. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law, Oxford: OUP, 2006. 
3 See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oldest_universities_in_continuous_operation for Wikipedia’s discussion of the 
issue with the claims of Nanjing and  Academy of Gundishapur in Iran as well as University of Al-Karaouine in Morocco 
and Al Azar in Cairo. 
4 C. Phillipson ‘Andrea Alciati and His Predecessors’ Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation New Series 13(2), 
1913, pp. 245–264. 
5 For a discussion generally see: W Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant, Cambridge: University 
Press, 1904. 
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mediaeval Europe. Indeed, most professions were cosmopolitan – not just the oldest profession but also 
the most venerated profession – medicine.  This applied not only to medicine and law but also the 
profession of arms where there was a claimed transnational affinity between knights and a code of 
chivalry setting out how one could and could not fight. Most soldiers did not fight directly for kings but 
for local lords or as mercenaries following ‘captains’ of ‘military bands’ or ‘military companies’.  They 
might be part of armies organized by kings.  But they might also fight against kings or in civil wars – or 
for foreign princes as individuals or groups who would fight in return for land or money.   
 
However, the rise of strong sovereign states in the seventeenth century turned these two, most 
cosmopolitan, professions into two of the least cosmopolitan.  Those who like a convenient date look to 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which provided the basis for state sovereignty.  These transitions 
arguably commenced long before Westphalia and were never fully completed 300 years later when the 
United Nations (UN) Charter enshrined key aspects of the Westphalian system.6 
   
The Westphalian Legal Profession 
 
The claim of sovereign states to determine the content of the law within their borders – including which, 
if any, ecclesiastical law, what form of economic regulation and what, if any, international law was to 
apply – meant that those who sought to study law would study the law of a particular sovereign state.  
Admission to practice was determined by domestic institutions – Courts, Inns of Court and various 
forms of apprenticeship and professional examination. In common law countries, universities were not 
initially engaged in educating lawyers for such practice.  English law was not even taught at Oxford 
until 1758.  However, after six centuries, even Oxford came around to teaching primarily English laws.   
                                                 
6 For example Chapter 1, Article 2, principles 1 and 7: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members” and “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII”. The concept of universal standards provided increased support for the human rights instruments which 
accompanied the Charter.  The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc A/810 71 (1948), explains that human rights are a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.  
Article II of the UDHR explains the universal application of human rights by stating: 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the State or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it is independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty.” 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) both support the notion of universality in their preambles when they state that nations are obliged 
to give “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms”. 
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Two other developments profoundly affected the law and lawyering: 
1. The rise of printing, which allowed legislation and case law to be disseminated more widely and 
in far greater detail than had ever been possible.   
2. The decline of feudal land tenure, the gradual decline in the importance of land in European 
economies and the extension of the market led to the idea that landholding typically involved an 
‘owner’ with sole dominion over it.7   
 
Over some 300 years, these developments came to be seen as so entrenched that they were perceived to 
be natural, and the legal pluralism of pre-Westphalian Europe seemed contrary to the very nature of 
law.  However, the last 10–15 years have seen the emergence of trends that involve profound 
challenges to the nature of law in Westphalian sovereign states.  The challenges to sovereignty include 
the rise of transnational law – including international law, free trade treaties, the extra territorial reach 
of United States (US) law and the development of universal jurisdiction.   
 
The rise of international and transnational organizations in the public, corporate and voluntary sectors 
has also increased the move towards pluralism.  The growth of the UN and the other pillars of the UN 
system (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) have led to a profusion of 
international organizations for global public purposes.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and now the World Trade Organization (WTO) are international 
judicial institutions capable of enforcing an increasing volume of international law and universal 
jurisdiction allows domestic courts to apply international law in certain circumstances.  While the 
WTO has real ‘teeth’, the growth of transnational supply chains and global corporations led to calls to 
establish internationally acceptable norms to bind corporations to international human rights norms. In 
response to the growth of corporations and their increased recognition as actors under public 
international law, the UN established the Global Compact.8  The Global Compact is a corporate social 
responsibility scheme where corporations agree to be bound by ten principles in return for the 
perception of being a good corporate citizen.  This scheme is the largest corporate citizenship group in 
                                                 
7 This development is in sharp contrast to feudal law when land was at the centre of life and likely to be subject to a range of 
rights.  In a sense, it was ‘too important’ to be simply owned by one person. 
8 The UN General Assembly on 5 December 2007 unanimously adopted a Resolution which supported the work of the 
UNGC Office: United Nations General Assembly, 62nd sess, 3 December 2007, Agenda item 61, Res Towards Global 
Partnerships; United Nations Global Compact; ‘UN General Assembly Renews and Strengthens Global Compact Mandate’, 
Compact Quarterly 12, 2007; See for a comprehensive discussion: A. Rasche,  ‘A Necessary Supplement’ – What the 
United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not, Business & Society 48, 2009.  
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the world with approximately 40,000 stakeholders across 100 nations.9 Despite the current limitations 
on the enforcement of international law, states have created regulatory vehicles to hold non-state actors 
accountable for unethical business practices.  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for example, provide voluntary guidance for corporations in their 
international affairs and are enforced by member states.10  While these guidelines have limited impact 
upon many corporations to which those guidelines are directed, they do represent moves by states to 
impose universal standards across jurisdictions.11  There is no barrier to OECD member States agreeing 
to implement similar ethical guidelines for the way lawyers conduct themselves in international affairs 
and they should be encouraged to do so.  
 
In the not-for-profit sector, the growth of international and transnational NGOs from the Red Cross to 
Greenpeace and Transparency International has given such NGOs a larger place in the global 
community than in most sovereign states. On the other hand, institutionalized religion has a more 
limited place than in pre-Westphalian Europe, despite attempts by fundamentalists in the ‘middle east’ 
and ‘mid-west’ whose aspirations for states dominated by particular religions are distinctly pre-
Westphalian.12 
 
More generally, the challenges of globalization, involving the movement of people, goods, services and 
ideas across boundaries, have increased the growth of a global community.  One important aspect of 
this is the emergence of the internet, which has created substantial difficulties for states that desire to 
regulate their citizens’ access to information.13  
 
The issue of sovereignty has been substantially challenged by the environmental problems facing the 
global community.  Arguably, the greater ease of movement of organisms that damage flora, fauna and 
                                                 
9 United Nations Global Compact, Annual Review 2006 2, 2007. The UN General Assembly on 5 December 2007 
unanimously adopted a Resolution which supported the work of the UNGC Office: United Nations General Assembly, 62nd 
sess, 3 December 2007, Agenda item 61, Res Towards Global Partnerships; United Nations Global Compact; ‘UN General 
Assembly Renews and Strengthens Global Compact Mandate’ Compact Quarterly 12, 2007. 
10 S. Cooney, ‘Improving regulatory strategies for dealing with endemic labour abuses’ SJD, Columbia University, 2005, pp. 
155–158; S. Cooney, ‘A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in Eradicating Foreign Sweatshops?’ Melbourne University 
Law Review 28, 291, 2004, pp. 315–316. 
11 For a criticism of the OECD Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises (2000) see: J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights’ Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 2008. 
12 The caliphate predated Westphalia by 800 years and the establishment of religiously defined colonies predated it by 30 
years. 
13 See for a discussion on attempts to regulate the internet: S. Deva, ‘Corporate complicity in internet censorship in China: 
Who cares for the Global Compact or the global online freedom act?’ George Washington International Law Review 39, 
2007, 255. 
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people and the unintended effects on the environment of human activity, are leading to an awareness 
that the land is, once again, too important to be the subject of the private dominion of individual 
citizens.  The perception that the environment should be regarded as a global issue arguably gained 
traction with the Convention on Climate Change and has obtained increased recognition with the Kyoto 
Protocol.14   The Kyoto Protocol ‘creates significant responsibilities for the participating countries, and 
brings together many of the most industrialized countries of the world to limit gas emissions in an 
unprecedented way’.15  
 
Sovereignty is also challenged by the flow of debt (toxic or otherwise), political ideology (toxic and 
otherwise), capital (mostly legitimate but including the proceeds of corruption) and viruses of varying 
degrees of virulence. None of these problems can be addressed by sovereign states attempting to act 
alone within their borders – though they can contribute to global solutions. 
 
Most of these trends will intensify over the next few decades and could lead to fundamental changes to 
the nature, practice, structure and content of law over the professional lifetimes of those students we are 
currently teaching.  By the time that students entering laws schools this year (2009) retire in the mid 
twenty-first century, the law and the legal profession may be as different from its Westphalian 
sovereign paradigm as that paradigm was to the world of Pepo’s students.   
 
The Westphalian Profession of Arms 
The profession of arms was also transformed by the rise of the nation state.  The European feudal 
system involved direct loyalty to local lords rather than to princes, kings or, in the Holy Roman 
Empire, the Emperor. Outside of the feudal system, mercenaries had been a common feature16  – 
particularly in pre-Westphalian Europe where soldiers’ loyalties were often to their immediate captain 
rather than to a sovereign.    
                                                 
14 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 ILM 849 (entered 
into force on 21 March 1994); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 16 March 1998 (entered into force on 16 February 2005); See for discussion of the impact: D. G. Victor, The 
Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming, New York: Princeton University Press, 2001..  
15 H. D. Shumaker, ‘The Economic Effects of the European Union Carbon Dioxide Emission Quota on the New Member 
States of the European Union: Can They Become Equal Economic Partners of the European Union While Complying with 
the 2008–2012 Quota?’ Pennsylvania State Environmental Law Review 17, 2008, 99. 
 
16 D. Stinnett, ‘Regulating the Privatization of War: How to Stop Private Military Firms From Committing Human Rights 
Abuses’ Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 28, 211, 2005, 213–216; The main instruments 
banning mercenary activities are the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) 42 and 
the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (UN Mercenary 
Convention) U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (1989) (entered into force Oct. 20, 2001). 
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 The growth of sovereign States resulted in standing armies that claimed the loyalties of their soldiers 
directly, rather then through their lords or captains.  States claimed a monopoly of legitimate violence.  
If the soldiers’ loyalty and duty were to the nation state, it was inappropriate for them to give their 
loyalty to, and fight for, one part of the state against another, risking the newly established order which 
it was the prime responsibility of the state to engender for the protection of its citizenry.  Professional 
soldiers saw themselves as maintaining order rather than contributing to disorder.  Similarly, it was also 
totally inappropriate for a soldier to fight for another state.  These principles were not always followed.  
Occasionally, the military would break up and join opposing sides in a civil war – something that was 
seen as the ultimate tragedy for a professional military force.  More often, the military would remain 
unified in suppressing insurgency – or unified in overthrowing governments in coups d’etat – one of 
the curses of the modern state.  On the external front, some states continued to recruit mercenaries, but 
they were generally looked down upon as not real soldiers.17  The use of mercenaries became less 
popular and in the twentieth century there were national and international steps taken to outlaw the use 
of private military forces.18  
 
The forces of globalization are changing the profession of arms as surely as the profession of law.  The 
last 20 years has seen the rise of private military forces associated with the US military, corporations 
and criminal gangs.  The largest remaining forms of private military forces exist in private military 
companies (PMCs).  These PMCs can provide training, security or direct military support.  The 
‘Sandline affair’ involved an attempt to bypass the Papua New Guinea military in suppressing a 
secessionist movement.19  Where PMCs perpetrate human rights abuses within a sovereign State on 
behalf of that State or an invading state, these forces have largely been immune from prosecution.  
More recently, the international community has been examining vehicles to hold PMCs responsible 
under international law.20  
 
                                                 
17 While some would argue that the Ghurkas are a potentially contradictory example, there were attempts to avoid 
considering them as mercenaries and their rights were never as extensive as Britain’s citizen soldiers.   
18 W. Singer, ‘Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International 
Security’, INT'L SEC. 26 186, 188–89, 2001/02, 191. 
19 S. Dinnen, R. May and A Regan (eds) Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, ANU Canberra: 
NCDS and Department of Political and Social Change, RSPAS, 1997; S. Dorney, The Sandline affair: politics and 
mercenaries and the Bougainville Crisis, Sydney: ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998. 
20 D. Morgan, ‘Professional Military Firms under International Law’ Chicago Journal of International Law 9, 2008, 213; D. 
Ridlon, ‘Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed Contractors in Iraq’ The Air Force Law Review 62, 2008, 
199.  
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While the monopoly of legitimate force was a matter of definition, in most states, most of the time, the 
military forces of the state could prevail over any and all other coercive forces ranged against them.  
For mainstream military forces, the development of the laws of war has entrenched codes of behaviour 
that can now be enforced by the International Criminal Court. The increasing range and intensity of co-
operation between military forces through participation in each other’s training programs, joint 
exercises and UN deployments are reinforcing the sense that soldiers are part of a common global 
profession of arms. Indeed, their common code of conduct is far more advanced being distilled into a 
number of international agreements – with the four Geneva Conventions and the three amendment 
protocols the most significant.21  
 
BUILDING GLOBAL PROFESSIONS AS IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD 
Global values and global institutions 
The trends towards globalizing the legal and military professions and others are important.  Indeed, 
given the absence of any equivalent to national governments within the international order, such 
professions may need to play a disproportionate role in building and sustaining that international order.  
The basis for this argument is a narrative that has much influenced my thinking over the last ten years. 
Good governance requires the articulation of governance values (for example, liberty, equality, 
citizenship, community, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and environmental sustainability)22 
and the institutions that can realize those values.  Since the seventeenth century, governance debates 
have centred on sovereign states rather than relations between them.  Late seventeenth century states 
were generally highly authoritarian and justified as such.  Hobbes argued that rational people would 
mutually agree to subject themselves to an all-powerful sovereign to avoid a ‘state of nature’ in which 
the life of man would be “poor, nasty, brutish and short”.23   
 
                                                 
21 First Geneva Convention ‘For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’ 
(first adopted in 1864, last revision in 1949); Second Geneva Convention ‘for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea’ (first adopted in 1906); Third Geneva Convention 
‘relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ (first adopted in 1929, last revision in 1949); Fourth Geneva Convention 
‘relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV); Protocol I (1977): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Protocol II (1977): Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts; Protocol III (2005): Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem. 
22 Though, not as recently as might be imagined, nineteenth century environmentalists sought to clean up the Thames and 
protect the countryside via the National Trust. 
23 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 p. 89. 
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Once internal order had been restored, this social contract did not seem such a good bargain. The 
eighteenth century Enlightenment sought to civilise these authoritarian states by holding them to a set 
of more refined and ambitious values – notably liberty, equality, citizenship, human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. Some of these values were adaptations of classical city state ideals to the much 
larger polities of the time.  Nineteenth century thinkers extended the range of rights championed and 
added concern for environment and for practical and social equality.  
 
Most importantly, the key to the Enlightenment governance project was a ‘Feurbachian’ reversal of the 
way rulers and ruled related to each other. Before the enlightenment ‘subjects’ had to demonstrate their 
allegiance and loyalty to their ‘sovereign’. The enlightenment proclaimed that ‘governments’ had to 
justify their existence to ‘citizens’ who chose them. Once the reversal of the relationship was suggested, 
it was very hard to go back. 
 
Values are rarely self-implementing: they require institutions to realise them.  Institutional innovations 
included an independent judiciary exercising judicial review of the executive, representative 
institutions, bicameral parliaments, federal division of functions, government and civil society 
watchdogs, universal education, questioning media and ‘responsible’ (or ‘parliamentary’) 
government.24  This development of governance values and the institutions to realize them can be seen 
as an ‘enlightenment project’.   
 
Debates have rightly continued over the precise meaning and relative importance of these governance 
values and the best institutional means of achieving them.  However, the centre of gravity in 
governance debates has remained the sovereign state with the ‘enlightenment project’ becoming a ‘UN 
project’ in which all the peoples of the world might become members of strong sovereign states 
securing their citizen’s universal human rights.   
 
This ‘UN project’ has been shaken by the ‘globalizing’ flow of ideas, people, goods and services 
flooding over international borders and weakening many sovereign states.  Liberal democratic values 
were formed in and for strong states.  Citizenship, democracy, welfare, and community have clear 
meaning within sovereign states but lack apparent application in a broader, more diffuse, globalized 
world. The institutions that sustain, promote and realize those values are very much state-based. The 
rights, duties and ‘sense of belonging’ that citizenship carries are attached to state institutions. 
                                                 
24 A feature shared by all long standing democracies other than the United States. 
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Democracy is realized through citizen participation in national and sub-national legislatures – and loses 
mileage if the real power and range of choice open to those legislatures is restricted. Welfare rights like 
education and healthcare are only implemented through the institutions of strong, sovereign (and 
wealthy) states – and even their capacity to do so is increasingly questioned. 
 
Two common responses are to abandon inconvenient governance values such as democracy and 
welfare or to resist globalization and strengthen the state.  I have long argued for a third approach 
because globalization exposes a flaw in the ‘enlightenment project’ and later ‘UN project.’25 How can 
universal rights be secured by geographically limited entities?  Why should the welfare rights of the 
citizens of some states be a tiny fraction of the welfare rights of others?  This approach suggests a 
fundamental rethink of our governance values and the mix of institutions that can achieve them – a 
‘global enlightenment’ in which, as in the eighteenth century, the ideals will come first and the 
practical institutional solutions will come later.26  As in the eighteenth century, when city-state values 
and institutions were re-worked and re-combined for nation states, sovereign state values and 
institutions may need re-working and recombining. 
 
I have argued that the institutional arrangements that are most likely to emerge and which are most 
likely to secure such values will not resemble ‘sovereign states writ large’.  It is more likely to look like 
pre-Westphalian Europe. States and multi-lateral institutions will be important but other institutions – 
corporations, superannuation funds,27 professions and NGOs may play a larger role.28 In this light, I 
will be considering the roles of the legal and soldierly professions in a future order and I will suggest 
that lawyers and the military should see themselves as part of an international profession, respecting 
international values.   
 
Towards global professions 
                                                 
25 C. Sampford, “Challenges to the Concepts of ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Intervention’,” closing keynote  World Congress on 
Legal and Social Philosophy, 1999, published in T. Campbell and B.M. Leiser (eds), Human Rights in Philosophy and 
Practice, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001 pp. 335–391. 
26 While deferring the institutional issues, I would emphasize that this does not amount to an argument for global 
government – the sovereign state writ large.  A more likely result is a mix of institutions reflecting both pre-Westphalian 
Europe and the modern ideal of an integrity system made up of public, corporate and NGO bodies. 
27 Especially if driven to engage in sustainable investment that meets the values and interests of their unit holders who have 
longer term interests than the investment managers.  
28 There is also likely to be a place for unions or faith based organisations – though I am not sure that their role will be 
larger or smaller.  It is relevant to observe that faith based NGOs have been involved in pressuring corporations to date on 
good corporate citizenship: L. Allen, ‘Religion and Corporate Social Responsibility: the Interfaith Centre on Corporate 
Responsibility and the Corporate Withdrawal Movement from Burma’, PhD Thesis, Boston University, 2003. 
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I suggest that the legal profession is, and should be, breaking free of its Westphalian shackles.  
Professions are not bound by their employers, let alone their states. This principle is the whole point of 
an independent profession.29 The concept of a profession involves a group who develops and deploys a 
body of knowledge and skills for a public purpose.  Such knowledge and skills can be used for good or 
ill – for the ostensible purpose which justifies the powers and privileges of the relevant profession or 
abused for other purposes.  As argued elsewhere,30 the justification of a profession (indeed, institutions 
generally) should be in terms of the values it furthers on behalf of the community in which it operates. 
Those values provide the core for ethical standard setting (both aspirational and disciplinary), legal 
regulation and institutional reform. 
 
The importance of ethical guidelines is axiomatic in the case of the military – whose knowledge and 
skills may involve the deployment of organized deadly force against other states in defiance of 
international law or deployed against the state itself (and generally the human rights of its citizens) in a 
coup d’etat.  The oft-asked question about the difference between a government and a band of robbers 
is repeated in asking the difference between the army and an organized group of violent gangsters.  The 
answer cannot simply lie in following orders of the civilian ‘commander in chief’ as to which groups of 
people are to be killed en masse as that does not guarantee that the military is more than a reliable 
accomplice.  The answer must lie in the values the military forces claim to espouse, the codes of 
honour and ethics they develop to realize those values, the commitment to that code and the 
institutional means that they provide in order to make that realization probable – including mechanisms 
for reviewing the actions of soldiers and applying appropriate sanctions.   
 
While lawyers cannot directly deploy lethal force, if they are not bound by ethical restraints they can 
provide advice, which can result in spectacular individual and social harm.  Where lawyers give advice 
on the legality of wars or torture, the consequences can be catastrophic for those who suffer invasion 
and/or torture. The fact that those who sought selective legal advice may leave office with their 
reputations shattered is small consolation and an insufficient deterrent.  
 
                                                 
29 In describing the profession as ‘independent’, this does not mean that it is entirely self-regulating. Zacharias’ essay in this 
volume points out the central role played by legislation and, especially, the judiciary. However, the main impetus for 
enunciating and developing legal ethics and the structure and role of the profession comes from lawyers with many of the 
regulatory and most of the disciplinary decisions in the hands of the judicial branch of the profession.  
30 See C. Sampford, ‘Law, Institutions and the Public Private Divide’ invited keynote address  Australasian Law Teachers 
Association Conference, Canberra, September 1990; C. Sampford and C. Parker, ‘Legal Ethics: Legal Regulation, Ethical 
Standard Setting and Institutional Design’ in S. Parker and C. Sampford, (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal Practice: 
Contemporary Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.11. 
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While the abuse of the knowledge and skills of lawyers is not as spectacular as the deployment of 
military force, it is potentially insidious if the knowledge and skills of lawyers are used to deny justice. 
Sometimes globalization makes this task easier – when lawyers forum-shop for jurisdictions wherein 
their clients can engage in lawful practices, which would be regarded as criminal in their home state.31  
A similar question arises with regard to the difference between a lawyer and a ‘spin-doctor’ – saying 
whatever suits the client’s interest and, in effect, making lawyers figuratively rather than literally ‘guns 
for hire’.  I have previously argued that, where the client refuses to have disputes heard in a court of 
competent jurisdiction, there is a temptation for clients to seek, and lawyers to give, advice they want to 
hear.  Under such conditions, they are not acting as lawyers but as spin-doctors, no better than the 
much despised Jamie Shea who was lent by Prime Minister Blair to NATO during the Kosovo conflict.  
Egregious examples include some of those who provided opinions to governments on the legality of the 
Kosovo and Iraq wars32 and the treatment of prisoners.33  As with the military, the answer for lawyers 
must lie in values, ethics, commitment and the institutional means for keeping lawyers to their task.  
 
In both cases, the professionals act, with very few exceptions, on instructions by the commander-in-
chief or client. However, they do so in an institutional context designed to further the core values of 
that profession and reduce the likelihood that the professionals’ knowledge and skills will be abused.  
In the case of the military in western states, the core values are the protection of the civil population 
and constitutional authority from external attack and, rarely, internal insurrection. For lawyers, the core 
values are the rule of law, due process, and human rights – sometimes packaged under an overall value 
of doing justice according to law.  For the military, it is civilian control by constitutional authority 
(only using force when legally permitted) and that force should be used against citizens under very 
strict rules and specific safeguards. However, there is considerable overlap. The core values of the 
military reflect core values for lawyers. Likewise, the rule of law and human rights can be central to 
some conceptions of the role of the military. Hon Mike Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, 
had argued that the military would be more likely to be successful if it subjected itself to the rule of law 
                                                 
31 For a discussion of where this has occurred in relation to bribery and medical trials see: P. Ala'I, ‘The Legacy of 
Geographical Morality and Colonialism: a Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade against Corruption’ Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 33 ,2000, 877; D. Fidler, ‘“Geographical Morality” Revisited: International Relations, 
International Law, and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in Developing Countries’ Harvard 
International Law Journal 42, 2001, 299. 
32 See C. Sampford, ‘Get New Lawyers’, Legal Ethics 6, 2003, 185–205; C. Sampford, ‘More and More Lawyers But Still 
No Judges’ Legal Ethics 8, 2005,16–22.  
33 The subject of numerous papers in the 2006 and 2008 International Legal Ethics Conferences. 
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in interventions because others knew when force would be used and when it would not. 34  In a 
workshop on ‘Reconceiving the Rule of Law in a Globalizing World’ in 2001, he argued that the 
Australian army was the largest human rights organization in Australia because it did more to further 
human rights through its peacekeeping operations than any other organization. 
 
I emphasize furthering core values of the relevant profession. It is not sufficient for a profession to 
avoid actions that compromise their core values. Professions take a lead role in promoting certain 
values.  Lawyers were critical in developing and proselytizing the rule of law and the institutional 
mechanisms to make it effective within strong sovereign states.  The military have taken a lead role in 
the strongest democracies in emphasizing their subordination to the Constitution, to law and to 
constitutional authority. Lawyers and soldiers should now do the same in international affairs, 
recognizing that the profession of arms may be an ally.  The rest of the lecture discusses how this 
concept might be understood and refined and how it might be strengthened, emphasising the role of the 
globalizing professions of arms and law. 
 
 
REFINING OUR UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
The ‘Domestic’ Rule of Law: A Contested Concept with Multiple Dimensions 
The rule of law is a majestic phrase with many largely reinforcing and supportive meanings.  It stands 
for a fundamental value or ideal, an ethic for lawyers and officials, the basic principles of 
constitutionalism and a set of institutions that supports its attainment.  While these multiple meanings 
and dimensions may occasionally serve to confuse, each of them are vital in achieving the others.  The 
partial achievement of each supports the fuller achievement of all.  
 
Some of the most popular definitions mix an expression of the normative ideal with the institutional 
prerequisites for the achievement of that ideal. Developing ideas found in Hayek, Fuller and others, 
Joseph Raz listed eight basic principles: (1) laws should be prospective, open and clear; (2) laws should 
be relatively stable; (3) law making should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; (4) 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; (5) principles of natural justice should be observed; 
                                                 
34 Discussions with the then Lt Col Kelly in 1999 during our work on an ARC linkage grant on ‘Preserving and Restoring 
the Rule of Law in the Asia Pacific’. 
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(6) courts should have review powers (of the exercise of power by others); (7) courts should be easily 
accessible; (8) discretion of crime-policing agencies should not be perverted.35  
 
The Rule of Law as a fundamental Governance Value 
The rule of law is now seen as one of the fundamental values underlying modern states – along with 
human rights, democracy and the famous trinity of liberté, egalité, fraternité.  It was not always so.  
The Treaty of Westphalia was, in many senses a tyrants’ charter – made by and for the absolutist rulers 
of the day.  It recognized a set of formally independent and equal states whose sovereigns were 
recognized on the basis of their ability to effectively control the territory of a state.  Their brutal 
suppression of the former rulers they displaced and others who did not accept their right to rule was an 
indication of sovereignty rather than a disqualification for it.  As discussed above, philosophes, lawyers 
and revolutionaries sought to impose a series of enlightened governance values on authoritarian states. 
The rule of law was the first of these values and many states were substantially rechstaats long before 
they saw even a modicum of democracy and human rights.  The rule of law is not only the longest 
standing of enlightenment values; it is generally the least controversial and is arguably the most 
fundamental.  
 
The Rule of Law as an Ethic for Officials 
The rule of law is a central ethical principle for judges and the legal profession more generally.  The 
profession’s central goal is the effective operation of law so that official power is exercised predictably 
and according to pre-determined rules.  The rule of law is also central to most officials including civil 
servants, the military and, at root, elected officials – power is held in trust to be used only to the extent 
permitted and for the purposes authorized.   
 
The rule of law has an illustrious history in Europe, the US and many Commonwealth countries.  The 
recent lack of support by the US and the United Kingdom36 may cause concern for some but it is 
important to recognize that the US, similar to most P5 members, has a very high degree of compliance 
with treaties and has been pressing for an enforceable rules-based system in global trade. While more 
                                                 
35 J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979; Chesterman summarizes 
these eight principles into three broad principles: S. Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 56, 331. 2008, 342. M. Aronson and B. Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, second edition, 
NSW: LBC Information Services, 2000, chapter 1. 
36 From the United States termination of, and refusal to accept, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice in 1986 to the British engagement in the Iraq war despite the clearest advice from their most senior international 
lawyers.  
 16
politicians openly argue that the US should ignore international law in the use of force, the legality of 
American interventions are strongly asserted – indicating that they seem to think that this is important 
politically and in the court of public opinion.  
 
The Rule of Law as a basic Constitutional Principle 
The rule of law underlies and is supported by basic constitutional principles such as constitutional rule 
and the separation of powers.  However, it does not require a formal or written constitution and the 
concept clearly pre-dates such instruments.  What the rule of law does seem to require is a separation of 
judicial power from legislative and executive power and a means of determining what texts are 
recognized as laws.     
 
The Rule of Law as a set of institutions 
Those who value the rule of law recognize that it can never operate effectively as a purely normative 
phenomenon (be it value, ethic or principle).  It requires institutions to make it effective.   
a. If we are to know what law must rule, it is necessary to have an institution or set of institutions that 
are sources for authoritative texts.  Legislatures are the most common but grundnorms can, and 
generally do, recognize other sources. 
b. There is a need for an institution that provides authoritative interpretations of the meaning of those 
texts in particular circumstances.   
Other institutions that can reinforce the rule of law include an independent bar, independent 
prosecutorial services and, to an extent, police forces.  Institutions such as the ombudsmen and 
independent commissions against corruption can make the laws more effective and ensure that powers 
are used for the purposes for which they are entrusted.   
 
The Rule of Law and nascent Integrity Systems 
Since the late 1990s, it has become increasingly accepted that the way to avoid corruption and other 
abuses of power require an ‘integrity system’ – a set of norms (formal and informal), institutions and 
practices that serve to promote integrity and inhibit corruption.  All effective integrity systems involve 
some basic institutional arrangements associated with the rule of law – especially courts and a legal 
profession that are not indebted to the holders of political power and can review the actions of powerful 
institutions to determine whether or not they are within power.  These institutions are the oldest and 
longest standing elements of the integrity systems of western states.   
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These meanings are now well developed, widely supported and generally achieved in the domestic 
affairs of most modern democracies and several autocracies.  They are mutually supportive so that the 
partial achievement of each supports the fuller achievement of all.  They are far less developed in 
international affairs and face obstacles that lead some to doubt the possibility of an international rule of 
law or international law itself.   
 
Apparent Difficulties in Developing and Operationalizing an International Rule of Law 
There are many difficulties in achieving the above meanings and dimensions of the rule of law in the 
international sphere.  I will not go into detail of previous conceptual work done by myself and my 
colleagues on reconceiving the rule of law in a more global world. Much of this can be found in a 
collection of essays and the last chapter of my most recent monograph.37 The general conclusion of this 
work is that the rule of law transfers conceptually very well across cultures and into the international 
sphere.  Chesterman set out three possible meanings of the international rule of law – the application of 
rule of law principles to states and other subjects of international law, priority of international law over 
other forms of law and the direct application of international law to individuals.38  I have adopted the 
first mentioned. 
 
Fundamental Values 
The concept of the rule of law used here is derived from the domestic law and the differences between 
domestic and international law may lead some to query its applicability.  The problem is not so much 
one of conceptualization but of commitment.  Low expectations about the effectiveness of international 
law may undermine its perceived legitimacy and the willingness of international actors to take it 
seriously.  In particular, concern is expressed about the commitment of the US and its allies to 
international law over the last 20 years.  Despite recent aberrations, Australia and the US have long 
been supporters of a rules based international system on a bi-partisan basis.  The quotation from 
President Eisenhower, referred to at the beginning of this lecture, is more representative of the long 
term views of Australians and Americans than the 24 years from Reagan’s repudiation of the ICJ to the 
electorate’s repudiation of George W. Bush. Even during those 24 years, the US claimed to act in 
conformity to international law and some of us have argued that it is in their interests to do so. With the 
greater realization of the limits of American military and economic power, unilateral action in 
                                                 
37 S. Zifcak, (ed.) Reconceiving the Rule of Law, London: Routledge, 2005, especially the lead essay, C. Sampford, 
‘Reconceiving the Rule of Law for a Globalizing World’ and the last chapter of C. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule 
of Law, Oxford: UP, 2006. 
38 S. Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ The American Journal of Comparative Law 56, 331. 2008, 342. 
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contravention of international law may become more difficult and less attractive. The alternate view is 
that the US should seek to rebuild and then strengthen international law as insurance for the time when 
their military power is equalled or surpassed. 
 
Ethics for officials 
The above problems of commitment to the international rule of law lessen the likelihood that 
international law will be at the forefront of the ethical considerations of lawyers and officials. Lawyer’s 
ethics, formed around the laws and institutions of nation states, may not show the same respect for 
international law as domestic law.  Indeed, Anglo-Saxon systems of legal ethics are based on the duties 
to courts.39  Where that domestic law reflects and advances other important ideals, lawyers may have 
much greater attachment to domestic law.  
 
Constitutional principles 
The limited reach and scope of international law mean that some may doubt the applicability of 
familiar constitutional principles on the UN.  This aspect is reinforced by the lack of familiar 
institutions such as legislatures and executives and the fact that the institutions that operate 
internationally are often hybrids, compromises and historical oddities.   
 
The limitations of international law 
International law emerges via different means (there is no real equivalent to a legislature), applies to 
states rather than citizens, has a radically different extent and lacks an all powerful sovereign body to 
enforce it.  However, most international law is followed most of the time despite the lack of a sovereign 
power with the monopoly of legitimate force. In fact, all laws are followed for a number of reasons – of 
which the nature and certainty of sanctions for breach is but one, and for most actors not the primary 
one.   
 
Institutions 
                                                 
39 While duties to clients are important, both kinds of duties are determined by courts and a lawyer’s ethical duties are based 
on being ‘officers of the court’. As the duty to client is ultimately determined by the court, it is not surprising duties to court 
take priority over duties to clients to the extent that there is a conflict. To me, there should be no conflict if the relevant 
duties are properly construed. In my view, the duty to the client is part of the lawyer’s duty to courts and the administration 
of justice. Lawyers representing clients in an adversary system are doing their duty to the court by ensuring that justice is 
done via a vigorous contestation of issues in front of that court. See Sampford, C. and Parker, C. "Legal Ethics: Legal 
Regulation, Ethical Standard Setting and Institutional Design" in Parker, S. and Sampford, C. (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal 
Practice: Contemporary Issues Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995  
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The largest problems for the international rule of law lie in the lack of institutions that create, interpret 
and enforce international law.  This lack of effective institutionalization inhibits the development of the 
rule of law in its other senses.  The lack of a legislature is not a fundamental problem for the rule of law.  
It makes change difficult but all that is needed is a set of clearly agreed sources, the means by which 
those sources generate authoritative legal texts, and the hierarchy of sources in cases of conflict.   
 
There is a court which can provide authoritative interpretations of those texts and of any conflicts 
between them.  What is more, the ICJ is harder to stack than the highest courts of any other jurisdiction 
in the world.  The problem is, of course, the lack of compulsory jurisdiction and the limited number of 
cases that can therefore be heard before it.40 This makes it much harder for the law to give clear 
guidance to those who want to be bound. The lack of an effective court that sits regularly also makes it 
difficult to develop and enforce ethical codes for international lawyers. 
 
Despite these problems, lawyers have attempted to develop voluntary international codes of ethics.  
One such effort was finalized on 10 October 2008 by the International Bar Association’s Anti-Money 
Laundering Legislation Implementation Group in consultation with members of the American Bar 
Association and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe.  The international anti-money 
laundering guidance issued for the legal profession sets out voluntary guidance on adopting a risk-
based approach to managing the occurrence of money laundering, including monitoring processes and 
training for lawyers. The International Bar Association has a two page ‘International Code of Ethics’41 
and the Union Internationale des Avocats has developed the “Turin Principles for the Legal Profession 
in the 21st Century” (2002). The only area with developed codes that are authorized and (in theory at 
least) enforced by courts are in the Internatioanl Court of Justice and the various ad hoc criminal 
tribunals for the Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Former Yugoslavia During 2008, two more ambitious 
projects were commenced. One is led by Philippe Sands and supported by the NYU/UCL Project on 
International Courts and Tribunals (PICT).42 It aims to develop a code of ethics for lawyers engaged in 
                                                 
40 If States do not agree to be bound by the ICJ, then the ICJ has no jurisdiction even over such crimes such as genocide.  
The voluntary nature of the ICJ even over breaches of Jus Cogens was emphasized by Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Rwanda (2002), request for the indication of provisional measures order, ICJ 12610, 40. In this case the parties accepted 
the Genocide Convention stated laws of the jus cogens.   The majority held that genocide enjoyed peremptory status; 
nevertheless, they held the ICJ Justice did not have jurisdiction to consider an action against a State which had not agreed to 
be subject to the court’s jurisdiction, pp. 71–72. 
41 First adopted in 1956, last amended in 1988 
42 See www.pict.org  
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the practice of international law, and its first meeting was held in London on June 12 2009.43 The other 
project, entitled Building the Rule of Law in International Affairs, is led by Professors Thakur, 
Chesterman and myself supported by IEGL, the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 
and the United Nations University (UNU) is funded by an Australian Research Council Linkage grant. 
At the time of writing, its first workshop is set for 19–20 October and will examine ethical supports for 
building the rule of law in international affairs. The two projects are collaborating, with the leaders of 
each project being invited to the workshops run by the other. 
 
ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF 
LAW 
One could conclude that, in many areas where the rule of law seems most needed, it is as distant as it 
would have seemed to those living under the largely absolutist regimes that emerged in Western 
Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia.  The fact that the heroic efforts by lawyers and revolutionaries 
over several centuries led to a remarkable transformation in those states may offer little comfort.  The 
international community cannot wait that long and cannot sustain the violent struggles that were often 
necessary for the rule of law to emerge domestically.  However, the rule of law is a very strong 
domestic ideal on which we can build and support. An ideal that is not only endorsed, but in many 
cases sincerely so, by various leaders’ summits.  To make the attainment of an international rule of law 
realistic, there needs to be coordinated action to address some of the institutional limitations of 
international law.  Lawyers can and should take a lead in such action – just as they did in the 
development of the domestic rule of law and the institutions that underpin it.  This is not the time or 
place to set out a comprehensive strategy for building the rule of law in international affairs to match 
the rule of law in domestic affairs (something we hope to be closer to at the end of the above-
mentioned projects). However, I will suggest some things lawyers may do and the reasons they may 
find unexpected allies in the military.  
 
Developing and Promoting the Rule of Law as a fundamental governance value in international 
affairs 
Just as lawyers were major contributors to the development and promotion of the rule of law in 
domestic affairs, so they should be in international affairs. However, they should not be so as narrow 
lawyers but as lawyers who understand the philosophical, political and economic issues it raises. 
                                                 
43 The meeting was attended by Profs Philippe Sands, Laurence de Chazournes (co-chairs), Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, Lord 
Jonathan Mance, Alexis Martinez, Judge Thomas Mensah, Prof Charles Sampford and Professor Alfred H Soons  
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Indeed, they should recognize that the rule of law was developed at a time when those disciplines had 
not yet become distinct. While mastering these disciplines in their entirety is not a realistic goal for 
individuals, it is for groups of lawyers who respect those disciplines and bring their insights to bear.  
 
If the rule of law becomes a fundamental value of the profession and a value that it uses to justify the 
profession, lawyers need to reflect carefully and debate publicly its meaning, value and relationship to 
the nature of the profession and its work to a global community. 
 
Ethical Standard setting through codes 
Lawyers can contribute to the articulation of more specific codes for lawyers and others – not least the 
military who are, as we have seen, potential allies in building the international rule of law. Lawyers 
should begin by developing a code of ethics for international lawyers and lawyers operating across 
borders.  However, this should not be done in isolation.  One of the most important underpinnings of 
the rule of law in modern states is the importance it plays in the ethics of key participants.  Lawyers 
have ‘duties to the court’ or, more generally, to ‘the law’ or ‘justice’.  Civil servants are concerned with 
ensuring that all action taken in the name of the state has legal authority.  More generally, the rule of 
law is an ethic for the wielders of power – to exercise powers they have for the purposes that are 
entrusted to them.  Codes need to be developed for:  
 International lawyers; International judges and tribunal members; and international civil servants.  
Such codes cover a variety of issues but centrally concern how entrusted power is handled and a 
commitment to international law and the rule of law in international as well as national affairs.   
 Member states and their delegates to General Assembly (GA), United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and international bodies (analogous to codes of ethics for parliamentarians in domestic 
systems).   
 Military forces which are acting under UN authority and military forces engaging in international 
action – reflecting the same kind of respect for international law and particularly the UN Charter 
that they are expected to show for domestic laws and domestic constitutions. 
 
The nature of the code development would vary depending on the work already undertaken and 
completed by others.  In all cases, the code development should consider the dilemmas, apparent and 
real conflicts of duties, as well as the pressures and temptations of practice that may lead participants to 
‘read down’ their ethical duties.  However, the focus of the work will vary depending on the codes and 
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principles already in place and the degree to which those codes and principles are controversial.  For 
example: 
 where there are rival codes or principles, it is very important to tease out the reasons for 
disagreement and make suggestions; and 
 where most of the relevant ethics codes are domestic (for example, practicing lawyers and, to a 
lesser extent judges), it is important to deal with issues involving the extension of existing codes, 
potential conflict between codes, the relationship between the duties to domestic courts and clients 
and relevant duties to international courts and clients. 
 
In all cases, the relationships between the codes must be considered carefully by examining the ways in 
which they may unintentionally conflict and ways in which they may be mutually supportive (for 
example, in the complementarity of the ethics of judges and advocates).   
 
Once relevant international codes for lawyers acting and advising in international matters are 
developed, their principles should be incorporated into domestic legal ethics codes so that respect for 
international law and the rule of law in international affairs is built into the codes by which most 
lawyers practice. Similar domestic implementation should be followed in professional civil service 
codes and military ethics. 
 
Other forms of ethical Standard setting 
The creation of codes is a high priority for a number of reasons. 
 There is a current opportunity to do so with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) 
project and there is a great deal of disquiet about the ‘torture memos’ discussed elsewhere in this 
volume. 
 The creation of an international code will emphasize the responsibilities of international lawyers to 
the international legal system separately from their responsibilities as lawyers within their domestic 
jurisdictions. 
 Such codes can provide inputs for those who want to reform the domestic legal ethics codes 
following the torture memos. 
 
While the creation of codes is a high priority and is a natural activity for lawyers, it should be 
recognized that this does not exhaust the ethics of this or any other profession. If legal ethics were co-
extensive with codes of ethics, two counter intuitive consequences would follow. First, it would mean 
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that there would be no sense in complimenting or criticizing the ethics codes. Second, it would make 
no sense to criticize the ethics of some and praise others. It would be pointless to compliment Lord 
Goldsmith for the first advice and to criticize him for the second advice. It would also be pointless for 
to refer to the temptation for clients to seek, and lawyers to give, the advice the client wants to hear 
rather than the advice the client should hear if they are facing court. If the client has no intention of 
accepting the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction, they should make it clear that they will 
not give such advice or, if they do, they will not be acting as lawyers and there should be no privilege.  
 
Before there are codes, people can debate what kind of conduct they admire as ethical and which they 
criticize as unethical. They can advocate new rules to bolster these normative claims. Even where there 
are codes in place, they generally set minimum standards of behaviour. There is room to articulate and 
practice according to what the proponents believe to be higher standards. These will help set standards 
even while they are supererogatory. While they may affect code development, there will always be 
room for such higher standards, and they are part of a dynamic profession.  
 
Legal Regulation and Institutional Development 
In all cases, the pressures for and against compliance should be considered.  While the initial focus of 
code development would involve the clarification of ethical standards for those subject to the pressure, 
and those who may be applying the pressure, suggestions would also be made for institutional changes 
that remove or reduce dilemmas, temptations and pressures for unethical behaviour.  
 
Simultaneously, the legal profession should be actively involved in strengthening institutions that will 
support the international rule of law and the participation of all states in it. Lawyers made tremendous 
contributions to the institutionalization of the rule of law domestically – not always succeeding and 
risking occasional death or imprisonment.  
 
1. Urge all countries to (re-)commit to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to any country that 
accepts.44  
2. Urge all states to commit to the use of force only subject to international law, with countries 
only going to war if there is a public statement by the most senior relevant legal authority (for 
example, Attorney-General or Solicitor-General) that, in their independent judgement, the war 
                                                 
44 As had the American Bar Association on several occasions. 
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is legal and that the government is prepared to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 
any case brought against it. 
3. If governments refuse to accept the jurisdiction of courts of competent jurisdiction, the legal 
profession must recognize the temptation to seek and the temptation to give, legal advice the 
client wants to hear – especially if that advice is published. The profession must be very clear 
that lawyers should not give way to that temptation on fear of disbarment.  
4. Such states should be treated in the same way as other delinquent clients who seek to evade 
courts of competent jurisdiction (generally by fleeing it) 
5. Lawyer-client confidentiality might be erased where the government is not prepared to defend 
its action in the ICJ – especially where they are likely to attack the court. The lawyer’s duty to 
law and the system of justice mean that they must report the planned commission of a crime. 
Note that it is hard to see any argument for privilege if the client does not intend that the matter 
go to a court of competent jurisdiction given that the point of privilege is to determine what 
may not be discovered or heard in court. 
6. Legal advice not tied to what a court of competent jurisdiction would find is not legal advice 
but spin.  
a. Professional bodies should not recognize it as part of legal practice and define it as 
conduct outside of legal practice which brings the profession into disrepute and should 
not be recognized as legal advice. 
b. Not protected by professional indemnity insurance 
c. Refer any substandard advice on going to war, torture etc. to relevant professional 
tribunals and the courts who oversee the ethics of lawyers in their own jurisdictions. 
d. Urge international tribunals to require those who appear before them to abide by codes 
of ethics for lawyers engaging in international practice and advice – disbarring them 
from appearance before international tribunals and declaring that they are not entitled to 
refer to themselves as international lawyers. In so doing, international tribunals start to 
take on the kind of supervisory role assumed by domestic courts in Anglo-Saxon 
systems. 
e. Develop formal legal rules to ensure civil and criminal accountability for at least the 
worst such examples (e.g. the torture memos).  
7. Move to define the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute so that politicians who start 
wars are as liable for breaches of ius ad bellam as soldiers are for breaches of ius in bello. 
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8. Control Private Military Companies – set out enforceable rules for their operation and 
criminalize those who do not commit to it. 
9. Campaign for the Security Council to subject itself to judicial review in the ICJ. 
10. Refuse to accept lawyers or judges in serious breach of their ethical duties to international 
conferences or other gatherings of the profession – a matter of naming and shaming.   
11. Follow a similar practice with military leaders who breach their ethical duties.45 
 
While most of these goals require the action of politicians, lawyers should take the lead in identifying 
the legal and institutional changes required. In many cases, the relevant leaders will be lawyer-
politicians. 
 
ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 
I will not spend as much time on the role of the military as my research and expertise lies primarily in 
the profession of which I am a part. However, the following points may be helpful. 
 
As emphasized throughout this lecture, lawyers should seek suitable allies within the military. During 
the lead up to the Iraq war, two of those most implicated, in what seems to most international lawyers 
to be a serious breach of international law, were lawyers turned prime ministers. Prime Minister Blair 
appears to have been instrumental in persuading Lord Goldsmith to produce a short and misleading 
opinion claiming the proposed war would be legal, omitting the caveats in his original advice.46 On 6 
March 2003, Prime Minister Howard told the Australian parliament that there was ample legal 
authority for the war although virtually no legal authorities supported it. 47  Some members of the 
military behaved much more creditably. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the Chief of the UK armed forces, 
refused to cross the Kuwait border without written legal advice that the war was legal.48 If the lawyers 
providing written advice for public consumption had been prepared to acknowledge the limited support 
their arguments had and the unlikelihood of being able to succeed in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the British military may have stopped the war. 
 
                                                 
45 This list incorporates most of the suggestions made in Sampford, C. “Get New Lawyers”, 6 Legal Ethics 2003 
46 R. Whitaker, ‘The Crawford Deal: did Blair sign up for war at Bush's Texas ranch in April 2002?’ The Independent 27 
February 2005. 
47 C. Sampford ‘More and More Lawyers But Still No Judges’ 8 Legal Ethics 16–22, 2005. 
48 A. Barnett and M. Bright, ‘British military chief reveals new legal fears over Iraq war’, Observer, May 1, 2005. 
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Later in the Iraq war, it was serving soldiers who first reported and then leaked what had happened at 
Abu Ghraib.  
 
While soldiers who are also lawyers may play an important role in this, it is the respect for international 
law by other soldiers that is determinative. In the Kosovo and Iraq wars, JAG officers in the armed 
forces advised against some targeting. The differential response of different militaries indicates the 
importance of their role and the extent to which the adherence to international law is built into their 
ethics and the way they see themselves serving their countries. In the Iraq war, this respect for JAG 
advice could have been motivated by an awareness of the ICC and the possibility of criminal 
conviction. However, the differential response in the Kosovo war indicates a difference in ethics of 
different militaries.  
 
The idea of professional obligation is deeply entrenched in the military – so deep that they are prepared 
to die for it – something other professions are rarely called upon to do.  But this is cross fertilized by 
the fact that a number of military officers are members of two professions – with engineers and doctors 
being more numerous than lawyers. While being a member of two professions may be potentially 
confusing, it is more likely to help them develop codes in underdeveloped areas. Some cross 
fertilization between professions in the military may assist.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This lecture endorses the idea that the rule of law should become as fundamental a governance value 
within the international community as it is within sovereign states. The legal profession should take a 
lead in developing our understanding of that value and the ethical and institutional means of realizing 
that value. The military are a potential ally and Americans have traditionally been, and hopefully will 
again become, natural allies in this process.  Our good work in the twentieth century has been tarnished 
by a poor end to the 20th century and a poor start to the twenty-first.  However, those who are either 
unduly optimistic or pessimistic of major institutional change might do well to recognize that history is 
a ‘long game’. But the way that long game will play out is not a matter of prediction but of action. 
What lawyers and soldiers do during the next 50 years will be crucial to how it plays out. Lawyers were 
critical to the crystallization of the rule of law in 17th century England – soldiers all but undid it and a 
bloody civil war almost destroyed the country.  This century – or more likely quarter century – we are 
playing for much bigger stakes. The international rule of law has been sufficiently conceptualized. This 
is the time when the international rule of law may be articulated, advocated and institutionalized. But 
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we cannot afford a global civil war along the way. This is why the international rule of law must be a 
key goal of the newly cosmopolitan and globalizing legal profession – and the increasingly 
cosmopolitan profession of arms must go along with them – not just to avoid conviction in the ICC but 
because of their conviction that internationally, as well as domestically, their use of force must be 
lawful. 
 
If it happens it will be because the lawyers of today act with high principle and they are joined by the  
It is our time and even more the time of those who are now leaving law schools 
 
Ten years ago, I was asked to deliver the final keynote the World Congress on Legal and Social 
Philosophy held in the World Trade Centre. I was asked to talk about sovereignty and intervention and 
I spent a good deal of time talking about the international rule of law. I drew a link between domestic 
and international rule of law and suggested that it was a great tragedy that the US, so long a leader in 
articulating and practising the domestic rule of law was setting such a bad example in the international 
rule of law. When I described illegal bombing from 15,000 feet was a new ‘high crime and 
misdemeanour’ I was told I must be a Republican. Had my interlocutor known of Eisenhower’s quote, 
he might have pressed me. But the answer is that the rule of law is neither Republican nor Democrat, 
Liberal or Labour, Left or Right. It is a fundamental governance value, a basic rule of the game – 
indeed it is the commitment to the idea that the game HAS rules.  
 
The one really worrying trend is the abandonment of the rule of law by some who consider themselves 
conservative – or the oxymoronic category of ‘neo-conservative’. The corollary of that is that the 
argument for the rule of law has so often to be run by the left and those genuine conservatives who 
fight for it are often against those who call themselves conservatives and that those conservatives who 
fight for it are treated as if they are left wing radicals.  
 
Let us hope that the implosion of the oxymoronic ‘neo-conservatism’ allows conservative, liberal and 
social democratic lawyers can make common cause on the rule of law – and take a lead in its 
realisation internationally as well as democratically – bringing with them the profession of arms and 
the vocation of politics. 
 
 
  
